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This book is comprised of sixteen new essays in religious epistemology 
and is divided into four parts with four chapters each: “Part I: Historical,” 
“Part II: Formal,” “Part III: Social,” and “Part IV: Rational.” The papers 
are very good, and the book delivers what its title advertises: lots of new 
insights in religious epistemology. I recommend it to anyone who wishes 
to dig into cutting-edge religious epistemology. Most of the papers are 
suitable for the graduate level or higher.
With sixteen papers, I risk saying nothing of substance about any one 
of them by trying to say something substantive about all of them. So, I 
will devote more time to certain papers. However, my saying little about a 
paper should imply nothing about my view of its quality and more about 
my own areas of specialty and ability to say something interesting about 
it. Readers can also turn to the editors’ introductory chapter for synopses 
of each chapter.
Part I opens with Charity Anderson’s paper, “Hume, Defeat, and Mir-
acle Reports.” Like many, I am familiar with Hume’s argument against 
miracles. But I hadn’t made clear the connections between his argument 
and concepts in recent epistemology. This is what Anderson does. She 
provides a careful discussion of Hume’s argument by drawing from re-
cent literature on testimony, formal epistemology, epistemic defeat, and 
knowledge-first. Her ability to bring all these topics to bear on Hume’s 
argument is impressive. Part I also includes papers by Richard Cross on 
Aquinas’s and Scotus’s religious epistemologies, Billy Dunaway on Duns 
Scotus and Henry of Ghent’s debate about the necessity of divine illumina-
tion for knowledge (with an interesting discussion of the safety condition), 
and Dani Rabinowitz on repentance in historic Jewish philosophy (with 
applications of Williamsonian epistemology).
Part II is more technical, with three papers applied to the fine-tuning 
argument. However, I think the main points in all the papers can be 
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followed, even if one cannot follow the most difficult parts. Roger White 
explores whether an infinite universe (with infinite and diverse religious 
believers) creates a bigger problem of religious diversity than the regular 
problem of religious diversity we observe here on Earth; after taking the 
reader on a philosophical journey, White concludes, “No.”
Isaac Choi explains how one person could know more than another 
person, despite their both having an infinite number of beliefs. He then 
applies his explanation to the so-called “normalizability problem” for the 
fine-tuning argument. Of note is Choi’s rejection of Cantor’s principle of 
correspondence for infinite sets. (This will surprise some, given its seem-
ing orthodoxy, but Choi shows how this rejection can solve a lot of prob-
lems and is not without precedent among mathematicians.)
John Hawthorne and Yoaav Isaac’s paper illustrates the power of 
Bayesian epistemology. By formulating the fine-tuning argument using 
Bayesian tools, we see both a forceful fine-tuning argument and also how 
misguided and weak many of its prominent objections are. It was fun to 
see them swat away objection after objection. Also, the three appendices of 
their paper should not be ignored since they break a lot of ground.
Lastly, Hans Halvorson presents a challenge for the fine-tuning argu-
ment. Although some parts of his paper are more technical, the main ar-
gument is built around the insight that we should take into account not 
only the low probability that the universe would be fine-tuned, but the 
low probability that God would make the universe in need of fine-tuning.
Part III includes three papers on testimony and one on the nature of 
faith. I have the most to say about Max Baker-Hytch’s paper, so I will save 
that for later in this review. Rachel Fraser draws from philosophy of lan-
guage and distinguishes two theories according to which a testifier can 
fail to transmit belief to a testifiee: 1) the testifiee might lack requisite emo-
tional capacities or 2) the testifiee might lack causal contact with the object 
that the testimony is about. Both theories, if true, would explain why some 
hearers of religious testimony might fail to gain religious belief by way of 
that testimony.
Jennifer Lackey distinguishes between two models of expert testimony: 
the expert-as-authority (where an expert’s testimony replaces all other rea-
sons the subject has) and the expert-as-advisor (where an expert’s testimony 
is evidence that is to be weighed with the other evidence the subject has). 
She argues that we should reject the former (along with Linda Zagzebski’s 
argument for it) and replace it with the latter. This has implications for how 
we view religious experts.
Paulina Sliwa’s paper is on the nature of faith. Just as we can understand 
the moral virtue of kindness in terms of acts of kindness (and knowing how 
to perform kind acts), she argues that we can understand faith in terms 
of acts of faith (and knowing how to perform acts of faith). Sliwa marshals 
many interesting thought experiments to support her view, applies her 
account to religious faith, responds to objections, criticizes Lara Buchak’s 
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account of faith, and ends with reflections on how her account applies to 
religious practice and Pascal’s wager.
Part IV includes one paper about the epistemology of modality and 
three papers on the justification or warrant of religious belief. Margot 
Strohminger and Juhani Yli-Vakkuri criticize Peter van Inwagen’s argu-
ment for skepticism about the metaphysical modality that underwrites 
premises of certain arguments in philosophy of religion. However, they 
then defend a Williamson-based modal epistemology that still casts sig-
nificant doubt on those same arguments.
Matthew Benton discusses the “Old Pascalian Problem” (the traditional 
Pascal’s wager), as well as the “New Pascalian Problem,” which arises 
from the relationship between pragmatic encroachment—the view that 
practical concerns can directly affect whether one knows—and religious 
epistemology. Much of the discussion revolves around the striking claim 
that it is harder to know that atheism is true than it is to know that theism 
is true because of the practical costs of believing the former and the practi-
cal benefits of believing the latter.
Swinburne defends a version of phenomenal conservatism—the view 
that an appearance that p provides prima facie justification for believing p. 
Using his characteristically methodical style, Swinburne carefully defines 
his terms and then places phenomenal conservatism within a Bayesian 
framework. An implication of Swinburne’s discussion for religious episte-
mology is that a seeming that God is present can justify believing theism, 
but a seeming that God is not present does not justify believing atheism. 
He writes, “an experience which is not an experience of [God’s] presence 
. . . is no greater evidence of his non-existence, than having an experience 
which is not an experience of a unicorn is evidence that there are no uni-
corns anywhere in the universe” (337).
I will now delve more deeply into the papers by Keith DeRose and Max 
Baker-Hytch. In “Delusions of Knowledge Concerning God’s Existence,” 
DeRose seeks to “express, explain, and to some extent defend my suspi-
cion that hardly anyone, if anyone at all, knows whether God exists” (288). 
On his view, beliefs that God exists, even if true, don’t amount to knowl-
edge. (In other words, they lack warrant, the property which turns true be-
lief into knowledge.) DeRose’s paper is partly autobiographical and reads 
like an honest and open-minded investigation. I enjoyed it and was led to 
reconsider whether my own theistic belief is warranted.
First, DeRose notes that religious experience is likely the best candi-
date for producing knowledge that God exists. (Philosophical argument, 
he thinks, is insufficient.) Second, he argues at length that the religious 
experiences people actually have will not do the job. For example, his own 
religious experiences are not sufficient for his theistic belief to be war-
ranted (294). He then notes that people who used to take themselves to 
know, but then later de-converted, will think that their prior religious ex-
periences were not so strong after all, and that “there was some element 
of insincerity, lack of genuineness, or even phoniness, in the certainty they 
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had earlier projected to the world” (295). He’s skeptical of people’s present 
self-ascriptions of knowledge because he’s seen enough de-converters later 
give negative evaluations of their prior self-ascriptions of knowledge (296).
Here is an objection to the content of DeRose’s suspicion. Surely, if God 
exists, at least someone knows that God exists: God. And if one of the major 
monotheistic world religions is true, then some major prophets will likely 
know that God exists. If Islam is true, no doubt, Muhammed knew that 
God exists. If Judaism is true, then Abraham and Moses no doubt knew 
that God exists. If Christianity is true, then Jesus, Peter, Paul, Mary, and 
other members of the early church knew that God exists. So, we should 
only think that nobody knows God exists if Christianity (and Islam and 
Judaism) are false.
Now, perhaps DeRose meant to restrict his claim to humans who are 
alive today. Maybe Moses knew that God exists, but what about you and 
me? I’ll suggest a way by which we could know that God exists, but I’ll be 
in a better place to do that after my discussion of Baker-Hytch’s paper, to 
which I now turn.
Baker-Hytch’s “Testimony amidst Diversity” was my favorite paper in 
the volume. I have the most to say about it, perhaps because it most over-
laps with my own research. He first notes that many religious beliefs are 
based primarily on testimony. He then investigates whether such beliefs 
are unreliably formed (even if they are true). He examines three ways to 
interpret “reliability”—as sensitivity, safety, and statistical reliability—and 
argues that testimony-based religious beliefs could have all three of these 
epistemic goods. It follows that if certain religious beliefs are true, then 
they probably are reliably formed. (Very roughly, S’s belief that p is sensitive 
if and only if if p were false, then S wouldn’t believe p. S’s belief that p is 
safe if and only if S couldn’t easily have falsely believed p [or propositions 
similar to p]; S’s belief that p is statistically reliable if and only if S’s belief 
is produced by a statistically reliable process. More precise, but lengthier, 
definitions are on 185.)
At this point, it will be useful to place Baker-Hytch’s paper in the larger 
dialectical context of the religious epistemology literature. This will help 
us to appreciate both the predecessors of some of its ideas and also the 
ways in which Baker-Hytch breaks new ground. In Warranted Christian 
Belief (Oxford University Press, 2000), Alvin Plantinga famously argued 
that if Christian belief is true, then it is probably warranted. Plantinga 
drew attention to his now well-known view that the warrant of Christian 
belief depends on its truth. In Plantinga’s terminology, the de jure (positive 
epistemic status) question about Christian belief depends on the de facto 
(truth) question. If Christian belief is true, Plantinga argues, then the Holy 
Spirit is likely to be involved in the formation of many Christian beliefs. 
And if that is so, Plantinga argues, then such Christian beliefs are likely to 
meet his proper functionalist conditions on warrant.
We can see that by arguing that certain religious beliefs would be re-
liably formed if those beliefs were true, Baker-Hytch is drawing from 
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Plantinga’s useful (and now seemingly obvious) point that de jure ques-
tions about religious belief can depend on de facto questions. We can also 
see that Baker-Hytch breaks ground in at least two ways. First, since he is 
not wedded to a proper functionalist theory of warrant, he can instead ask 
whether religious belief, if true, is likely to have other positive epistemic 
properties than those mentioned in Plantinga’s proper functionalist theory, 
such as safety, sensitivity, and statistical reliability. This is important since 
many epistemologists are interested in these properties and also think 
they are necessary for warrant. Second, Baker-Hytch explores whether 
those forming their religious beliefs by way of ordinary human testimony 
would have these positive epistemic properties; he doesn’t imagine them 
forming their beliefs by way of the direct testimony of the Holy Spirit or 
some other divine method. So, we see how Baker-Hytch owes some of the 
framing of his discussion to Plantinga’s but also moves beyond it.
The main reason Baker-Hytch considers for thinking that religious be-
lief is unreliably formed, if based on human testimony, is that such testi-
mony-based processes produce beliefs in a great number of contradictory 
religious systems. In reply, Baker-Hytch carefully argues that many reli-
gious beliefs—especially monotheistic ones—would be sensitive, safe, and 
formed by statistically reliable processes (if true). He imagines Jane, who 
believes Christianity primarily on the basis of her parents’ testimony and 
the Bible (185–186). Baker-Hytch notes that, given Christianity’s truth, it is 
likely that the beginning of the testimonial chains that resulted in Jane’s 
Christian beliefs was God’s activity in the early church. He then carefully 
argues that this makes it probable that Jane’s Christian belief would be 
sensitive, safe, and statistically reliable. In the process, Baker-Hytch again 
breaks new ground. For example, when exploring sensitivity, he exam-
ines both impossible as well as possible worlds; when exploring safety, 
he is sensitive to the various bases one might hold fixed when examining 
nearby worlds; when assessing statistical reliability, he is sensitive to work 
on the generality problem. His effort, to me, was convincing.
Baker-Hytch then argues that the testimony-based religious believer 
can avoid defeat that comes from awareness of religious diversity. A mono-
theistic religious believer, like Jane, could have a good argument that her 
belief is likely to be reliably formed if true. The reason is that if there is an 
“extremely powerful, knowledgeable, and morally good deity,” then it is 
likely that that such a being would have “ensured the reliable testimonial 
dissemination of the core tenets” of that religion (196). Non theistic reli-
gions would have no deity playing that role. Jane would thereby have a 
symmetry breaker between herself and believers in nontheistic religions.
Lastly, despite all the nice things Baker-Hytch says about a testimony-
based believer like Jane, he reveals a downside: Jane could not have reflec-
tive knowledge of her religious beliefs, i.e., she can’t know that she knows. 
He writes,
[W]hile there is good reason to think that the truth of any one of the major 
monotheisms makes it overwhelmingly likely that God acted specially in 
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order to bring about revelatory events at the beginnings of the relevant testi-
mony chains, it is far from clear that the truth of any of these belief-systems 
makes it especially likely that God would engage in special promptings in-
tended to result in second-order beliefs (199).
Even if Jane’s Christian belief is reliably formed, Baker-Hytch argues, she 
would still have no reason to think that her belief is reliably formed.
Now to discussion. I’ll first make a point about the scope of the believ-
ers to which Baker-Hytch’s argument will apply. If Christianity is true, 
then, as Plantinga argues, a great many Christian beliefs are not formed by 
ordinary human testimony. Rather, the Holy Spirit’s own testimony and 
instigation will be involved in Christian belief formation. Now, this point 
is minor since Baker-Hytch’s argument is still worth considering for those 
Christian and nonChristian religious believers who do only believe by way 
of ordinary human testimony. Plantinga’s view tells us nothing about the 
warrant-status of Christian beliefs that were not directly instigated by the 
Holy Spirit. And even if the Holy Spirit is at work in the formation of every 
Christian belief, it’s still worth exploring what the warrant-status of Chris-
tian belief would be if the Holy Spirit weren’t so active and was instead 
only directly active at the beginning of the testimonial chain.
My second point is an objection. I challenge Baker-Hytch’s claim that 
Jane has no reason to think that her belief is reliably formed, even if it 
is based on human testimony. Baker-Hytch takes himself to have argued 
that < if Christian belief is true, then it is probably reliably formed >. There 
is nothing that prevents Jane from being apprised of Baker-Hytch’s argu-
ment for this conditional. Suppose also that Jane’s belief that < Christian-
ity is true > is reliably formed (as is supposed in Baker-Hytch’s scenario). 
Then Jane can perform a simple modus ponens inference and conclude that 
her Christian belief is probably reliably formed. So, Jane can have good 
reason to think her belief is reliably formed; hence, it seems that reflec-
tive knowledge is open to her. So, I agree with nearly all of Baker-Hytch’s 
claims, but I don’t agree with the one that claims that Jane couldn’t have 
reflective knowledge.
Lastly, let us return to DeRose’s paper. Plausibly, if Christianity is true, 
then the apostles knew God exists. Many Christians today, like Jane, are 
directly linked by testimony to some of those apostolic knowers; the testi-
monial chain is only one link long in the case of Jane reading her Bible, and 
it is a bit longer in the case of Jane hearing from her parents. Furthermore, 
if Baker-Hytch’s arguments are correct, then Jane’s Christian belief is prob-
ably safe, sensitive, and reliably formed. The combination of these proper-
ties, along with its testimonial origin, provides a good case for thinking 
Jane’s Christian belief is warranted, and hence, that she knows God exists. 
So, even if DeRose is correct that religious experience (and philosophical 
argument) is not enough for theistic knowledge, Baker-Hytch’s argument 
suggests that ordinary testimony is enough.
